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OPPRESS ME NO MORE: AMENDING THE ILLINOIS LLC ACT
TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL REMEDIES FOR OPPRESSED
MINORITY MEMBERS
PAUL T. GESKE*
INTRODUCTION
In his 2014 State of the State Address, Illinois’ Governor proposed
lowering the filing fee for limited liability companies (LLCs) from $500 to
$39, the lowest in the country, as a way of drawing new businesses to Illinois.1 However, making Illinois an attractive place for businesses requires
more than just financial incentives.2 Illinois should provide a stable legal
environment in which the rights and obligations of business-owners are
predictable and unambiguous.3 Given the popularity of LLCs among entrepreneurs and small businesses,4 lawmakers should start by revisiting the
Illinois Limited Liability Company Act (ILLCA).5
Courts and commentators recognize that LLC members who own a
minority interest in their company, like minority shareholders of close cor-

01/14/2015 15:25:42
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* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. Monique Garcia et al., Quinn Pushes for Minimum Wage Increase, Early Childhood Education Spending, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2014, 7:16 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/politics/clout/chi-quinn-pushes-for-minimum-wage-increaseearly-childhood-education-spending-20140129,0,1416085.story?page=1. In 2014, Patrick Quinn was
governor of Illinois and delivered the State of the State address. Bruce Rauner defeated Quinn in the
November 2014 election and took office in January 2015.
2. See, e.g., Amanda Vinicky, Businesses: LLC Fee Drop a Drop in the Bucket, WUIS.ORG
(Feb. 3, 2014, 6:05 AM), http://wuis.org/post/businesses-llc-fee-drop-drop-bucket.
3. For example, Delaware is known for being an attractive state to corporations because of its
responsiveness to corporate needs, well-developed case law, and prestigious reputation. WILLIAM L.
CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 83 (7th ed. 1995). For
that reason, Delaware is “the preeminent state in terms of the number of publicly held corporations
incorporated there.” Id.
4. Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Liability
Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 90 (1994) (“Limited liability companies uniquely combine attributes
of partnerships and corporations in a way that makes them very attractive to closely held businesses.”);
Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: Learning (or not) from Close
Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 885–86 (2005) (“In recent years, [the application
of the oppression doctrine to the LLC] has taken on critical importance, as the LLC has emerged as the
favored business structure for many closely held enterprises.”).
5. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 (West 2013).
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porations, are particularly vulnerable to oppressive6 conduct like freezeouts and deadlock.7 In some situations, members are even more vulnerable
than their shareholder counterparts.8 For these minority interest-holders, the
ILLCA offers little clarity, as it neither defines oppressive conduct nor an
oppressed member’s rights, and only states that an LLC must dissolve and
wind-up its business upon a finding of oppression.9 However, because
courts are reluctant to impose a harsh remedy like dissolution,10 oppressed
LLC members may require additional or alternative relief appropriate to
their grievance. But the ILLCA provides no other options. As a point of
comparison, the section of the Illinois Business Corporation Act (IBCA)
dealing with oppression of shareholders of “non-public corporations” creates at least twelve different remedies for oppression.11 In contrast to this
section of the IBCA, the oppression provision of the ILLCA is simultaneously ambiguous and terse.12
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6. “Oppressive” is a legal term of art that now appears in many business corporation acts and
LLC acts. Its meaning has been defined over time by the courts. The definition is broad yet highly factspecific, and will be discussed below in Part I.C.
7. Where the parties’ relationship breaks down, corporate norms of majority rule enable the
controlling group to exclude the minority from the business and from receiving any profits. Market
forces do not constrain this behavior, because there is no market for ownership interests in small businesses. See generally Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513
(Mass. 1975); Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Int’l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (“The interest owned by a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation is often a precarious
one. In fact, it has been characterized by this court as being one of ‘acute vulnerability.”); F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1:13 (3d ed. 2013).
8. The added flexibility and freedom to contract enjoyed by participants in LLCs offers little
protection and may only exacerbate problems if the parties’ operating agreement is slanted to favor the
party with greater bargaining strength. F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 6:2 (2d ed. 2013) (“LLCs are now set up to follow
the experience of close corporations where participants similarly chose the corporation for liability and
tax reasons and encountered unexpected problems down the line after a falling out among the parties.”);
Mark J. Loewenstein, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.: A Historical Perspective, 33 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 339, 365 (2011) (“The typical limited liability company act contains few protections for
members and most of these protections are waivable in the operating agreement.”); see Sandra K.
Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of
the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 426–27 (2001)
(“[R]estrictions on withdrawal and/or distribution rights effectively ‘lock in’ the LLC owner whose
agreement lacks a provision expressly bestowing buyout rights or a provision addressing deadlocks or
disputes. In these circumstances, the minority LLC member is potentially more vulnerable to a squeezeout than a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation.”).
9. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1 (West 2013); see also Bahls, supra note 4, at 84
(examining the LLC statutes of other jurisdictions and finding that “state statutes do not typically
authorize courts to order equitable remedies less drastic than dissolution”).
10. See infra notes 164–165 and accompanying text.
11. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 2013).
12. See infra Part III.B.1.
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Leaving the ILLCA as is would be improvident; there are already over
200,000 LLCs in Illinois,13 and the LLC is emerging as the premier entity
for small-business owners and entrepreneurs.14 This Comment advances the
argument that the Illinois legislature should amend the ILLCA to provide
greater protection and additional, flexible remedies for oppressed minority
members of LLCs. Even in the absence of an amendment, courts should be
willing to render equitable remedies similar to those in the IBCA because
there is little justification for differentiating between LLCs and close corporations in this respect.15 Additional protection and flexibility is necessary
to safeguard minority members, ensure the confidence of investors, and
make Illinois an attractive place for new businesses.
Part I of this comment briefly recalls the origin of the LLC as an entity
before discussing why minority shareholders and members are especially
vulnerable to oppression. It then outlines what courts have done to provide
a remedy in cases involving oppressive conduct. Part II covers a recent case
that illustrates the problems created by a poorly drafted LLC act. Part III
lays out proposed changes to the ILLCA that would provide additional
protection to minority members. Part IV addresses counterarguments to the
proposed changes.
I. UNDERSTANDING THE LLC AND OPPRESSION IN CONTEXT

01/14/2015 15:25:42

13. See Vinicky, supra note 2. The number of LLCs nationwide has grown rapidly as well. In
1993, there were only 17,000 LLCs nationwide, but by 1996 there were 221,000. MELVIN ARON
EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 502–03
(8th ed. 2000).
14. See Bahls, supra note 4, at 48 (“Because of the unique combination of tax benefits with
limited liability, limited liability companies are likely to become the organizational form of choice for
many closely held businesses.”); Laurel Wheeling Farrar & Susan Pace Hamill, Dissociation from
Alabama Limited Liability Companies in the Post Check-the-Box Era, 49 ALA. L. REV. 909, 909 (1998)
(calling the LLC “the newest and fastest growing business form”).
15. Moll, supra note 4, at 976 (“[T]he ‘seeds’ of oppression in the close corporation are also
present in the LLC setting. As a result, the LLC seems destined to repeat the oppression experience of
the close corporation.”).
16. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 498.
17. See generally Moll, supra note 4.
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Understanding the problem of oppression in LLCs requires some
background knowledge, including a familiarity with the entities that preceded the LLC. The LLC inherited its structural features from its older
cousins, partnerships and corporations.16 And along with those features, the
LLC also inherited the problem of oppression.17 This Part outlines the legal
history of the LLC, and then explains why minority members are so vulnerable to oppression and what courts have done in the past to remedy the
problem.
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A. History Leading Up to the LLC
It is helpful to think of the various business entities as existing along a
spectrum. On one end are small, mom-and-pop partnerships or sole proprietorships. On the other end are large corporations with many shareholders and publicly traded stock. Toward the middle of the spectrum, it is more
difficult to draw distinctions between different types of entities. Even so,
courts have attempted to classify business entities for the purpose of giving
each type a fairer treatment under the law.18 Defining the differences between entities has important consequences for entrepreneurs, business
owners, and the attorneys who advise them as they decide which entity to
form.19
During the twentieth century, as the corporation became a more popular and flexible vehicle for businesses, courts grappled with how to apply
older, stodgy legal doctrines in new situations.20 Traditionally, corporation
statutes were rigid, and legislatures and courts were slow to accommodate
changes in the business community.21 Over time, legislatures relaxed their
corporation statutes as a way of drawing new businesses to their state and
generating tax and fee revenue.22 This process is sometimes called the “race
of laxity.”23 Nonetheless, as more and more businesses decided to incorporate to receive the benefit of liability protection, courts had to deal with the

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 101 Side B
01/14/2015 15:25:42

18. See generally Thomas M. Madden, Do Fiduciary Duties of Managers and Members of Limited Liability Companies Exist as with Majority Shareholders of Closely Held Corporations?, 12 DUQ.
BUS. L.J. 211 (2010).
19. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 76–77 (discussing the increasing complexity involved in choosing which entity to form coupled with the blurring between different forms); O’NEAL &
THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 2:3.
20. Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 365–66 (2d Cir. 1959) (“As the corporation became a
more common vehicle for the conduct of business it became increasingly evident that many corporations, particularly small closely held ones, did not normally function in the formal ritualistic manner
hitherto envisaged.”); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
BUS. LAW. 699, 702 (1993) (“Traditional corporate norms, oriented as they are toward publicly held
corporations, proved unsuitable for close corporations.”).
21. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d at 365–66 (For example, laws that limited the activities of corporations to a stated purpose and legal doctrines, such as ultra vires, proved to be formalistic to the point of
burdensome); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 161 (11th ed. 2010) (“Historically, a great deal of
importance was attached to the statement of purposes in the articles of incorporation . . . . This problem
has just about disappeared under modern statutes.”); id. at 172–73 (“when all is said and done, the [ultra
vires] doctrine was an undesirable one, involving harsh and erratic consequences.”).
22. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 138–39.
23. Id. (“The removal by the leading industrial states of the limitations upon the size and powers
of business corporations appears to have been due, not to their conviction that maintenance of the
restrictions was undesirable in itself, but to the conviction that it was futile to insist upon them . . . .
Lesser states, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in charters, had removed safeguards from
their own incorporation laws . . . . The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.”).
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problems created by applying the same corporation statute in radically different situations.24
1. The Close Corporation: A Precursor to the LLC
One subject of great interest to early corporate law commentators is
the difference between close corporations and regular corporations.25 Large
corporations that have publicly traded stock are distinct from close corporations, but otherwise, it is difficult to make broad generalizations.26 Not all
large corporations have publicly traded stock and not all non-public corporations are close corporations. And due to the circumstances, underlying
policies, and problems unique to close corporations, formal rules of corporate law sometimes seem incongruous in cases involving smaller, closely
held businesses.27 In some cases, courts have even analogized the close
corporation to a partnership, and imported legal doctrines from partnership
law.28
In the second half of the 20th century, courts and legislatures began to
recognize close corporations as a sui generis.29 Probably the most famous
case defining the close corporation is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A
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24. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 387 (2013) (“With this growth [in the number of close corporations] came an increase in the problems peculiar to close corporations, which increase forced recognition of basic differences between the close and the publicly held corporation, and of the inadequacy of
laws developed for the latter when applied to regulation of the day-to-day affairs of the former.”);
HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 166 (“[M]ost states have adopted some provisions designed to ameliorate
to some extent the traditional rules of corporate management when applied to small corporations.”).
25. Although commentators have devised different ways of measuring whether something is a
close corporation or closely held business, most agree that they have a small number of shareholders.
CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 269. For early discussion on the subject of close corporations, see
generally Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948), and
Norman Winer, Proposing a New York “Close Corporation Law”, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 313 (1943).
26. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 269 (“Exactly what constitutes a close corporation is
often a matter of theoretical dispute.”).
27. Id. at 279–80 (“[M]any of the problems raised by the early close-corporation case law reflects
the fact that traditional statutory norms were drafted with publicly held corporations in mind.”); Farrar
& Hamill, supra note 14, at 932 (“[C]lose corporations developed as a reaction to vast problems experienced by small business owners using a business form, the corporation, with default provisions and
legal doctrines totally unsuited for small business.”).
28. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 269 (“[C]ertain aspects of partnership law form an
important backdrop to the study of close corporations . . . . [I]n recent years legislators and courts have
increasingly looked to partnership-law norms in solving close-corporation-law problems.”).
29. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 585 (Ill. 1964) (“This court has recognized, albeit sub
silentio, the significant conceptual differences between the close corporation and its public-issue counterpart.”); O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:21 (“Courts, like legislatures, increasingly have
recognized the distinctive characteristics and needs of close corporations and have shown a growing
willingness to treat these enterprises differently than public-issue corporations.”); Farrar & Hamill,
supra note 14, at 924 (“Over time, both courts and legislatures recognized a need to alter the traditional
corporate law to provide relief for minority shareholders in closely held corporations.”).
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30. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
31. Id. at 511.
32. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 269 (“[T]he close corporation resembles the partnership, which is also typically characterized by a small number of owners, as well as owner-management
and nontransferability of ownership interests.”).
33. Id.; see Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
34. Duckworth, 249 F.2d at 486 (discussing “the practical realities” of close corporations, “in
which the stockholders, directors and managers are the same persons.”).
35. Id.
36. Partnerships have a more flexible structure and are easier and cheaper to set up compared to
corporations, because there are no required filings with the state and no need to draft bylaws or comply
with other corporate formalities. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 75 (“corporations tend to be
more costly to organize and maintain than other forms”).
37. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975).
38. Id. at 520.
39. Id. at 521.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 102 Side B

New England.30 In Donahue, the Massachusetts Supreme Court devised a
three-part definition of close corporations as those with: “(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3)
substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction,
and operations of the corporation.”31 These three attributes show that close
corporations have a lot in common with partnerships.32 For example, shareholders of close corporations, like partners, act in multiple roles.33 It is
typical in close corporations for the shareholders, directors, and officers to
be the same people.34 Thus, in both partnerships and close corporations
there is usually no separation between ownership and management.35 In
fact, if not for the attractiveness of limited liability protection, some businesses might have foregone incorporation and formed partnerships instead.36
The Donahue court went further than just classifying close corporations as a distinct breed. The actual issue before the Donahue court concerned shareholders’ fiduciary duties to fellow shareholders.37 The court
considered whether a controlling group of directors, possessing a majority
of stock of the corporation, owed a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders, and whether they breached that duty when they voted to purchase
the shares of a retiring director at a special price without giving the same
deal to the minority shareholders.38 The court held that the majority shareholders’ refusal to extend the same deal to the minority was a breach of
fiduciary duty, and the corporation had to give the minority the same opportunity to sell back its shares at an identical price.39
Recognizing the need for greater protection of minority shareholders,
the Donahue court imposed heightened fiduciary duties on shareholders of
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close corporations.40 The court borrowed from partnership law, holding that
“stockholders in the close corporation owe one another substantially the
same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to
one another.”41 This statement was momentous because under traditional
corporate law, ownership of stock alone, without more, imposed no fiduciary duties on a shareholder.42 This traditional rule may be appropriate for
public corporations, where there are many shareholders, most of whom are
passive investors who probably do not know or even have any contact with
other shareholders.43 However, in the close corporation context, shareholders’ heightened duties are more appropriate from a policy standpoint.44
Majority shareholders in close corporations wield a substantial amount of
power, as they often double as directors or officers.45 This power, when
coupled with the particular vulnerability of the minority, justifies greater
legal safeguards.46 While parts of the Donahue holding have since been
limited in certain contexts by subsequent cases,47 the case has had a major
influence on corporate law and shareholder duties.48

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 103 Side A
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40. Id. at 513.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (“In general, a mere
owner of stock in a company does not owe a fiduciary duty to that company. The [Illinois] Business
Corporation Act provides that ‘[a] holder of or subscriber to shares of a corporation shall be under no
obligation to the corporation or its creditors with respect to such shares’”); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN &
ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 9:11 (2013)
(“Corporate shareholders . . . generally owe no duty to each other or the firm when they act solely as
shareholders.”); CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 271 (“The traditional view [now changing in
certain important respects] was that, shareholders do not stand in a direct fiduciary relationship to each
other.”).
43. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:9 (“Unlike the typical shareholder in a publicly held
corporation, who may be simply an investor or a speculator and does not desire to assume the responsibilities of management, the shareholder in a close corporation considers himself or herself as a coowner of the business and wants the privileges and powers that go with ownership.”).
44. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (Ill. 1964) (“While the shareholder of a public-issue
corporation may readily sell his shares on the open market should management fail to use . . . sound
business judgment, his counterpart of the close corporation often has a large total of his entire capital
invested in the business and has no ready market for his shares should he desire to sell. He feels, understandably, that he is more than a mere investor . . . . [A] large minority shareholder might find himself
at the mercy of an oppressive or unknowledgeable majority.”); Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316,
323–24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (internal citations omitted) (recognizing “a significant difference between a
shareholder of a closely held corporation and a shareholder of public stock” for similar reasons).
45. See Galler, 203 N.E.2d at 584 (“[T]he shareholders of a close corporation are often also the
directors and officers thereof.”). See also supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
46. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:22.
47. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988) (“the Donahue remedy is
not intended to place a strait jacket on legitimate corporate activity.”); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
48. See, e.g., Hagshenas, 557 N.E.2d at 323 (adopting the Donahue court’s holding regarding
fiduciary duties); O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:21 (calling Donahue “[t]he most recognized
separate judicial treatment of close corporations”); Loewenstein, supra note 8.
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Today, years after the Donahue decision, many states give close corporations different treatment and use a definition that is similar to, if not
the same as, the three-part test set forth in Donahue.49 Indeed, courts and
academics frequently cite Donahue and its progeny as support for separate
treatment of close corporations.50 Illinois has not expressly adopted the
Donahue definition, but uses one that is essentially the same.51 Along with
Illinois, states that treat close corporations as distinct entities do so through
a combination of statutory and common law,52 and it is typical for states to
allow businesses to elect to be treated as a close corporation when filing or
amending their articles of incorporation.53 In these states, close corporations are governed under specific provisions rather than the general business corporation act.54
The creation, or rather, recognition of the close corporation as a distinct entity is important in two respects: it is an example of courts responding to the practical realities of the business community, and it shows that
courts are willing to be flexible when applying a rigid body of corporate
law to closely held businesses. Laws that were based on the classic corporate form seemed harsh when applied to close corporations, and the Donahue court’s solution ameliorated that harshness.
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49. Loewenstein, supra note 8. However, other states have rejected the Donahue approach outright. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379–80 (Del. 1993) (rejecting a cause of action for oppression in a Delaware close corporation and positing that minority shareholders should instead bargain for
contractual protections); HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 366 (“Delaware appears to have flatly rejected
the approach of Donahue.”).
50. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 362–63 (“The [Donahue holding] has been widely cited and
accepted. Courts in more than 25 states have either cited Donahue approvingly or have cited cases that
relied upon Donahue . . . .”); Charles W. Murdock, Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the
1990s: Legislative and Case Law Developments and Their Implications for the Future, 56 BUS. LAW.
499, 570 (2001) (“[Donahue has] been cited as precedent in many jurisdictions.”); see, e.g., Nelson v.
Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn. 1997) (citing to Wilkes and Donahue for their holding regarding fiduciary duties owed by majority shareholders to the minority).
51. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E. 2d 577, 583 (Ill. 1964) (“[A] close corporation is one in which the
stock is held in a few hands, or in a few families, and wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by
buying or selling.”); Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1219 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Illinois law and citing to Donahue).
52. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 280 (comparing the corporation statutes in California, Delaware, and New York); RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2 (discussing the “statutory
close corporation”).
53. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2.
54. Id.; 6 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 387 (2013).
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2. The Limited Liability Company: The Birth of a Hybrid Entity
The LLC55 started out as an experiment, and now it is the premier entity for small businesses.56 The first state to enact a law creating the LLC as a
business entity was Wyoming in 1977.57 The goal was to create an entity
that would enjoy both limited liability and favorable federal income tax
treatment.58 In the past, businesses had to choose between the liability protection of a corporation and the favorable tax treatment of a partnership.
Corporations offer limited liability to shareholders, but corporate profits are
taxed twice—once at the entity level and once again at the shareholder
level because individual shareholders report dividends on their personal tax
returns.59 Alternatively, partnerships receive pass-through taxation, meaning that profits are only taxed once at the time when the partners report
distributions of profits from the partnership on their personal tax returns.60
However, partners are not protected from outside liability and are personally liable for the obligations of the partnership.61 The LLC solved this longstanding dilemma, combining partnership taxation with corporate limited
liability.62
Initially, there was uncertainty as to whether Wyoming’s experiment
would succeed. At first, treasury regulations essentially provided that an
LLC could receive pass-through tax treatment as long as it was not too
much like a corporation.63 The regulations identified four corporate-like
features, and if an entity had three or more of those features, then it would
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55. “An LLC has been described as ‘a non-corporate business that provides its owners (‘members’) with limited liability and allows them to participate actively in the entity’s management.” CARY
& EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 78.
56. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1185–86 (“The [LLC] is now undeniably the most popular form
of new business entity in the United States . . . . Rising from near obscurity in the 1990s, the LLC has
now taken its place as the new ‘king-of-the-hill’ among business entities, utterly dominating its closest
rivals . . . . [T]he number of new LLCs formed in America in 2007 now outpaces the number of new
corporations formed by a margin of nearly two to one.”); RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2;
see supra notes 13–14.
57. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2; Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 364.
58. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2; see generally Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins
Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459 (1998).
59. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 496 (“[I]f the [corporation] has income or expenses, or gains or
losses, those items go into the [corporation]’s taxable income, not into the owners’ taxable income. If
the [corporation] then makes distributions to its owners out of after-tax income, the owners ordinarily
pay taxes on those distributions. This is sometimes referred to as ‘double taxation.’”).
60. Id. (“[A general partnership] is not subject to taxation. Instead, all of the [partnership]’s
income and expenses, and gains and losses, are taxable directly to the [partnership]’s owners. Distributions are not taxed. There is no ‘double taxation’ effect.”).
61. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 306 (West 2013) (“[A]ll partners are liable jointly and severally
for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.”).
62. Bahls, supra note 4, at 52–53; Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 909.
63. See Miller, supra note 8.
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be taxed as a corporation instead.64 The four features were continuity of
life, limited liability, free transferability of ownership interests, and centralized management.65 States’ efforts to comply with these regulations are
reflected in many early LLC acts, which contained provisions designed to
defeat the LLC’s continuity of life by providing for dissolution upon specified events such as a member’s death or bankruptcy.66 The need for these
workarounds and legal fictions was short-lived, however, because the Internal Revenue Service issued a new set of regulations in 1996, often called
the “check-the-box” regulations, which allowed LLCs to simply elect to be
taxed as a partnership without regard to their corporate-like features.67 The
advent of the check-the-box “era” is significant for two reasons: first, the
LLC increased in popularity because its favorable tax status was assured;68
second, it became harder for members to dissolve or dissociate from an
LLC as states curtailed the easy-exit provisions that they had originally
included to defeat the entity’s continuity of life.69
In response to increased demand from the business community, other
states followed Wyoming’s lead. Now, every state has an LLC act.70 In
Illinois, the LLC Act was enacted in 1992 and later amended in 1998 and
2001 to its current form.71 As a general rule, the ILLCA, like other states’
LLC acts, only governs by default, and “an operating agreement may modify any provision or provisions of [the] Act governing relations among the
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64. Id.
65. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1184–85.
66. These statutes also provided that the LLC would continue to exist beyond dissolution as if it
never dissolved as long as all the remaining members so consented. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/35-3(b) (West 2014) (“At any time after the dissolution of a limited liability company and
before the winding up of its business is completed, the members . . . may unanimously waive the right
to have the company’s business wound up and the company terminated.”).
67. Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 912; HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1267.
68. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:2 (“After . . . the [IRS] stated clearly that properly
organized limited liability companies would be treated as partnerships, all of the remaining states
adopted limited liability company statutes.”).
69. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 1:4 (“The check-the-box tax classification
rule . . . has caused statutory drafters to reconsider the ‘noncorporate’ characteristics in existing LLC
statutes. In particular, many LLC statutes have been amended to eliminate the rule that an LLC must
dissolve on the dissociation of a member.”); Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 929 (discussing Alabama’s LLC act and noting the “elimination of dissolution rights, that were once but no longer needed
to ensure that the LLC would meet the partnership classification regulations”); Murdock, supra note 50,
at 501.
70. CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 536 (6th ed. 2006); Murdock, supra note 50, at 499.
71. See generally 7 CHARLES W. MURDOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 5:2 (2d ed. 2014).
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members, managers, and company.”72 Aside from a few exceptions, the
members can draft an operating agreement that modifies, supersedes, or
eliminates any of the various statutory provisions of the ILLCA.73 This
makes the LLC a creature of both contract and statutory law.74
The LLC is a hybrid entity in another sense as well. It combines characteristics of both corporations and partnerships.75 For example, as with a
corporation’s articles of incorporation, founders of an LLC in Illinois must
file “articles of organization” with the secretary of state.76 However, like a
partnership, the relationships among the members of an LLC are primarily
governed by agreement, namely an operating agreement.77 The operating
agreement also sets out how the business will be managed and conducted.78
Indeed, contracting is at the heart of the LLC’s identity.79 Compared to a
corporation, members of an LLC have more freedom and flexibility to define their relationships via contract.80
Regarding its management structure, an LLC can be member-managed
or manager-managed, which will make it more like either a partnership or a
corporation, respectively.81 In member-managed LLCs, as with partner-
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72. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(a) (West 2013) (but note that some exceptions to the
default rule are available: the quoted section references these exceptions, which are listed in subsection
(b)).
73. Id.; Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 933 (“LLC business participants that wish to eliminate
all dissociation rights can easily do so in the operating agreement”).
74. Katris v. Carroll, 842 N.E.2d 221, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (quoting Harbison v. Strickland,
900 So.2d 385, 389 (Ala. 2004)).
75. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 78 (“Some characteristics of the LLC resemble those of
partnerships; other characteristics resemble those of corporations.”).
76. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1187 (“Like limited partnerships, corporations, and LLPs, LLCs
are formed by filing a document, usually known as the ‘articles of organization’ or ‘certificate of organization,’ with the secretary of state or equivalent official of the appropriate jurisdiction.”).
77. Id. (“The real detail on the governance of an LLC is usually provided in a separate document
known as an ‘operating agreement’ or a ‘limited liability company agreement.’”).
78. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1187.
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2013) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give
the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of limited liability
company agreements.”); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 291 (Del. 1999) (“The
basic approach of the Delaware Act is to provide members with broad discretion in drafting the Agreement and to furnish default provisions when the members’ agreement is silent. The Act is replete with
fundamental provisions made subject to modification in the Agreement . . . .”).
80. Murdock, supra note 50, at 518 (“[W]ith the [LLC] statute generally only providing default
provisions, the organizers of an LLC should be able to create whatever structure, and use whatever
nomenclature, they desire.”).
81. See Robert B. Keatinge, New Gang in Town, BUS. L. TODAY, Apr. 4, 1995, at 5; see also 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1 (West 2013) (pertaining to management of a limited liability company).
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ships, there is no separation between ownership and control.82 And like
partners, by default each member has equal rights in the management and
conduct of the business.83 Alternatively, manager-managed LLCs offer a
corporate-like structure, and are typically governed by a “board of managers” analogous to a board of directors.84 The operating agreements of such
LLCs can prescribe whether each individual member’s voting power will
be proportionate to the quantity of the member’s ownership interest, as
with shareholders of corporations.85
On the spectrum of business entities discussed above, the LLC falls
closer to the mom-and-pop side, somewhere between the partnership and
the close corporation. Because it has a flexible structure, the limited liability protection of a corporation, and the favorable tax treatment of a partnership, the LLC is especially popular for small business owners and
entrepreneurs.86
B. Vulnerability Endemic to Closely Held Businesses
Courts generally, including those in Illinois, have long recognized that
minority shareholders of close corporations are in a particularly vulnerable
and precarious financial position.87 Shareholders of close corporations often invest substantial personal savings in the corporation.88 They may also
rely on employment by the corporation as the source of their livelihood.89
And unlike partnerships where each partner by default has an equal right to
manage the partnership,90 corporations are managed by majority rule.91 As
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82. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1190 (“Most LLC statutes assign, as a default rule, all management functions to members . . . . This member-managed structure resembles a general partnership, as
each of the owners has management rights.”).
83. See id.; 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1(a)(1) (West 2014) (“each member has equal
rights in the management and conduct of the company’s business . . . .”); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT
§ 401(f) (2013) (“Each partner has equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business.”).
84. RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 42, § 2:3.
85. Id. § 8:3.
86. See generally id. §§ 9:10 to 9:11.
87. Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583–84 (Ill. 1964) (discussing the unique properties of close
corporations that place minority shareholders at the “mercy” of an oppressive majority); Walensky v.
Jonathan Royce Int’l, Inc., 624 A.2d 613, 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); see also Kantzler v.
Benzinger, 73 N.E. 874 (Ill. 1905).
88. 6 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 387 (2013) (“Frequently such corporations were made up of
shareholders who contributed a large part of their general assets to the business, looked to the company
for employment to furnish their principal livelihood, and expected to be intimately involved in company
management.”).
89. Id.
90. See supra note 83.
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a result, there are many ways in which the minority in interest is at the
mercy of the majority or controlling group.92 Where one party has a controlling interest, the minority is virtually dependent on the majority to safeguard his or her personal investment.93 And since the owners of close
corporations are often family members or friends, shareholders lean heavily
on the trust and loyalty of their fellow shareholders.94 If the parties’ relationship starts to break down, or the minority wants to pull its investment
out of the business, the minority cannot easily sell its shares because there
is no market and no willing buyers for ownership interests in closely held
businesses.95 All this makes minority shareholders particularly vulnerable
to oppressive conduct. And these reasons apply just as strongly, if not more
strongly, to minority members of LLCs.96
1. Freeze-Outs
If the parties’ relationship breaks down, the minority’s interest and entire investment may be at stake.97 For example, one common type of internal discord is the “freeze-out.”98 A freeze-out involves a pattern of behavior
designed to force the minority out of the corporation.99 Some typical
freeze-out tactics include withholding dividends, voting strategically to
prevent the minority from having representation on the board, issuing new
shares to dilute the minority’s interest,100 and other forms of hostility di-
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91. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:16 (“The usual corporate statute centralizes all
corporate powers in the hands of the directors. Holders of a majority of voting shares can elect most or
all the members of the board and the board normally acts by majority rule.”).
92. J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) (“The greatest
opportunities for exploitation exist in close corporations where the power to control resides with one
faction. In that instance, the controlling or majority faction has significant opportunities to exploit the
minority.”).
93. Id.
94. See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1026–27 (N.J. 1993) (shareholders in close corporations frequently consist of family members or friends and once the personal relationship is destroyed,
the company deteriorates.); Moll, supra note 4, at 912–13 (“[C]lose corporation owners are frequently
linked by family or other personal relationships [and] there is often an initial atmosphere of mutual
trust.”).
95. See infra notes 104–107 and accompanying text.
96. See Miller, supra note 8.
97. See Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 1983) (“when the personal relationships among the participants [in a close corporation] break down, the majority shareholder, because of
his greater voting power, is in a position to terminate the minority shareholder’s employment and to
exclude him from participation in management decisions.”).
98. See generally Note, Freezing out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1630 (1961).
99. Id.
100. See Katzowitz v. Sidler, 249 N.E.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. 1969) (“When new shares are issued,
however, at prices far below fair value in a close corporation or a corporation with only a limited mar-
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rected toward the minority personally.101 Where the minority shareholder is
employed by the corporation, a freeze-out may also include firing the minority shareholder or reducing his or her salary.102
Unlike shareholders of regular corporations, minority shareholders of
close corporations and minority members of LLCs are particularly vulnerable to freeze-out tactics and other oppressive conduct.103 First, the shares of
close corporations and memberships in LLCs are unmarketable.104 It is
difficult to value these shares or find a willing buyer.105 Even if the minority could find a buyer, that person likely would not want to trade places with
the minority.106 This means that the minority cannot simply unload its
shares whenever it wants out of the business.107 Second, shareholders of
close corporations and members of LLCs typically have a substantial personal investment in the business.108 Whereas shareholders of public corporations usually have diverse portfolios, minority shareholders of close
corporations and LLCs may have all their eggs in one basket and may
therefore rely heavily on their investment for receipt of salary or dividends.109 Third, the founders of close corporations and LLCs often fail to
plan ahead and provide adequate contractual protection for their interest.110
This is especially perilous in the LLC context since the members’ internal
relationships are governed principally by an operating agreement, rather
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ket for its shares, existing stockholders, who do not want to invest or do not have the capacity to invest
additional funds, can have their equity interest in the corporation diluted to the vanishing point.”).
101. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1028 (N.J. 1993) (“oppression is usually directed at a
minority shareholder personally”); Mary-Hunter Morris, Only “The Punctilio” If I Say So: How Contractual Limitations on Fiduciary Duties Deny Protection to Victims of Oppressive Freeze-outs Within
Private Business Entities, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 73, 87–88 (2008).
102. See Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
103. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
104. Moll, supra note 4, at 891–92.
105. Id. at 898–99 (“Even if a minority shareholder could locate prospective outside investors, a
minority ownership position in a close corporation is unlikely to garner much interest. A minority
ownership position lacks sufficient voting power to control the operations of the firm. As a result, a
minority interest is far less appealing (as well as less valuable) to outside investors.”).
106. Id. (“Where the company has a track record of oppressive majority conduct, a minority interest is even less attractive.”).
107. Id. (“The lack of an active securities market for the stock and the relative undesirability of a
minority position effectively doom any effort to sell.”).
108. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
109. Moll, supra note 4, at 890–91 (“[T]he close corporation investor generally looks to salary
rather than dividends for a share of the business returns because the ‘[e]arnings of a close corporation
often are distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits.’ When actual dividends
are not paid, therefore, a minority shareholder who is discharged from employment and removed from
the board of directors is effectively denied any return on its investment as well as any input into the
management of the business.”).
110. Id. at 911.
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than by statute.111 The operating agreement allows the members to modify
nearly every provision of the LLC statute, including members’ fiduciary
duties, as long as doing so is not manifestly unreasonable.112 So a member
with greater bargaining power can draft the operating agreement in a way
that curtails members’ obligations to one another.113 A failure to provide
contractual protection for minority members ex ante leaves them exposed
in the event of oppression, deadlock, or freeze-out.114 Further, at least one
study showed that a significant portion of LLC operating agreements are
based on prewritten forms.115 This only exacerbates the problem, as forms
are not individualized or tailored to the members’ business.
Freeze-outs are only possible because corporations are operated according to majority rule.116 The shareholder(s) with the majority or controlling interest can dominate decisions, including elections of directors, hiring
and firing of officers, and deciding whether to declare dividends.117 In a
typical freeze-out, the minority is voted off the board of directors, fired
from employment by the corporation, refused access to books and records,
or otherwise marginalized.118 If the majority also declines to declare dividends, the minority will see virtually no return on its investment.119 And
because the minority’s shares are unmarketable, its interest is effectively
held hostage by the corporation.120 With its entire investment on the line, an
oppressed minority faces a dilemma: either remain in the corporation and
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111. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
112. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-5(a) (West 2013).
113. Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 930 (“Practitioners advising sophisticated business owners
and joint venture participants undoubtedly can give many examples of clients insisting that the LLC
operating agreement eliminate, as much as the tax law would permit, all dissociation and dissolution
rights.”).
114. Id.
115. See Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 422 (2003).
116. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 1:2 (“[A] corporation operates under the principle of
majority rule: the holders of a majority of the shares with voting power control the corporation. Persons
holding a majority of the voting shares have the power to elect all the directors . . . . In turn, the board
of directors usually acts by majority vote . . . . Under this pattern of corporate control, majority interests
can deprive minority interests of any effective voice in the operation of the business.”).
117. See Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993) (“[B]ecause the majority has the
controlling interest, it has the power to ‘dictate to the minority the manner in which the corporation is
run.’”) (citing Bostock v. High Tech Elevator Indus., Inc., 616 A.2d 1314, 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992)).
118. See supra notes 98–102 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 109.
120. Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1027 (“The inability to reflect dissatisfaction by withdrawing one’s
investment places the majority shareholder in an enhanced power position to use the minority’s investment ‘without paying for it’ . . . . As a consequence, a shareholder challenging the majority in a close
corporation finds himself on the horns of a dilemma, he can neither profitably leave nor safely stay with
the corporation.”).

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 107 Side B

01/14/2015 15:25:42

P08 - GESKE (WITH SMALL CHANGES).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

200

1/5/2015 9:38 AM

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 90:1

be marginalized, or give in and sell the interest back to the corporation at
an artificially low price and potentially part with a substantial portion of
personal savings.121
Practically speaking, freeze-outs only occur in close corporations and
LLCs.122 In other entities, an owner of a minority interest is simply not
susceptible to the same tactics.123 For example, if a controlling group of a
public corporation tried to freeze-out a minority shareholder, the shareholder would simply sell its shares and move on to another investment.124
Or if a controlling partner of a general partnership tried to freeze-out another equity partner, the partner could easily dissolve the partnership.125
Minority shareholders of close corporations cannot take advantage of these
options, and minority members of LLCs have very limited options, if
any.126
2. The Business Judgment Rule: An Additional Hurdle
In practice, minority shareholders have trouble challenging the propriety of the majority’s actions in court because it is very difficult to overcome the business judgment rule.127 Under the business judgment rule,
courts will defer to the judgment of a corporation’s directors and are reluctant to second-guess their decisions in managing the corporation.128 As long
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121. Id.
122. Moll, supra note 4, at 891 (“In the public corporation, the minority shareholder can escape . . . abuses of power by simply selling its shares on the market. By definition, however, there is no
ready market for the stock of a close corporation. Thus, when a close corporation shareholder is treated
unfairly, the investor ‘cannot escape the unfairness simply by selling out at a fair price.’”).
123. Id. at 897 (“In a publicly held company, a shareholder dissatisfied with the conduct of management can sell its holdings on a securities market and recover the value of its investment. This ability
to liquidate protects public corporation investors from the conduct of those in control.”).
124. Shareholders of publicly-traded firms are also protected by their right to sell out if they are
dissatisfied with current management. REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (1994).
125. Dissolution is much easier under partnership statutes than under corporation statutes.
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 801(1) (West 2013), allows partners to exercise their right to dissolve the
partnership at will.
126. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 92, at 6 (“[N]o other form of business organization
subjects an owner to the dual hazards of a complete loss of liquidity and an indefinite exclusion from
sharing in the profitability of the firm.”).
127. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:16 (“The effectiveness of fiduciary duty is limited
by judicial use of the business judgment rule, a doctrine which embodies a broad judicial deference to
the corporation’s board of directors in matters of business policy.”).
128. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 3:3 (“[C]ourts ‘hesitate to substitute their judgment on
complicated questions of business policy for that of the elected managers of the business and have
limited the scope of judicial review they are willing to undertake.’ The business judgment rule usually
operates as a presumption that the directors acted appropriately.”). Illinois courts take this position as
well. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 423 (Ill. 1892) (“[C]ourts of equity
will not undertake to control the policy or business methods of a corporation, although it may be seen
that a wiser policy might be adopted, and the business more successful if other methods were pursued.
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as the majority exercises an informed business judgment, its actions will
not be subject to searching judicial oversight or close scrutiny.129 This deference makes it easier for the majority to act oppressively with impunity.130
At the very least, the business judgment rule weakens the effectiveness of
legal obligations like fiduciary duties and protections like anti-oppression
provisions.131
C. Oppression
Oppression is a term of art used in many LLC and close corporation
statutes,132 although it is usually not defined within the statute itself.133
Instead, legislatures have left it up to the courts to flesh out the word’s
meaning.134 As a cause of action, oppression is an independent ground for
relief and the plaintiff need not show fraud, illegality, mismanagement,
wasting of assets, or deadlock, although evidence of such factors is sometimes present.135 Oppression can also be part of an ongoing course of conduct.136 The term embraces a broad range of improper conduct, reflecting
the fact that courts have defined the term expansively in the close corporation context.137 At one time, the most oft quoted definition of oppression
described it as:
burdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct, a lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its members,
or a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a[] violation
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[The majority shareholders] must be permitted to control the business of the corporation in their discretion.”).
129. See Wheeler, 32 N.E. at 423; see also CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 410 (“If the
conditions of [the business judgment rule] . . . are met, then under the rule the substance or quality of
the director’s or officer’s decision will be reviewed, not under the basic standard of conduct to determine whether the decision was prudent or reasonable, but only under a much more limited standard.”).
130. O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 8, § 3:3 (“[I]f the business judgment rule applies, the
court’s review is cursory; almost any reason supporting the directors’ action will usually suffice.”).
131. Id.
132. Thompson, supra note 20, at 710 (“Thirty-seven American states now include oppression or a
similar term in their corporations statutes.”).
133. Id. at 711; see, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) (“[Oppressive conduct] does not enjoy [definitional] certainty gained through long usage. As no definition is
provided by the statute, it falls upon the courts to provide guidance.”).
134. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1178; see also Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14,
at 927 (“Courts and commentators dealing directly with statutory oppression remedies . . . have struggled over the statutory definition of oppression.”).
135. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
136. Id.
137. Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. App. 1988).
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of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a
company is entitled to rely.138

The above definition, as general as it is, reflects the fact that courts
have taken “an especially broad view of the application of oppressive conduct to closely held corporations, where oppression may more easily be
found.”139
It is also common for court definitions of oppression to include some
reference to the minority’s reasonable expectations.140 The reasonable expectations approach requires a highly factual inquiry into the facts and
circumstances of each case, since “actions which might be oppressive under one set of circumstances will not be oppressive under others.”141 The
reviewing court will ask “whether the acts complained of serve to frustrate
the legitimate expectations of minority shareholders.”142 The expectations
definition is an ideal one for courts and commentators who see oppression
as primarily a protection against freeze-outs, because it puts the focus back
on why the minority entered the business and what it hoped to get out of its
investment and continuing participation in the enterprise.143 For example,
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a
place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would
be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to
defeat those expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.144

The expectations definition of oppression gives courts a way to provide the equitable relief from freeze-outs that minority shareholders
need.145 The disadvantage of the expectations definition is the ambiguity
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 108 Side B
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138. Id. at 382 (quoting Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387 (Or. 1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted). This definition has its roots in English common law.
139. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381 (quoting Skierka v. Skierka Bros. Inc., 629 P.2d 214 (Mont. 1981));
see also HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 462 (“[T]he kinds of conduct within a closely held corporation
that are viewed as oppressive have been broadened both by statute and by judicial decisions analogizing
the closely held corporation to a partnership.”).
140. Cynthia S. Grandfield, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Shareholders in Closely
Held Corporations: The Morality of Small Businesses, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 381, 386–87 (2002); see
generally In re Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance Ctr. Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901(N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Davis,
754 S.W.2d at 381; Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders’ Reasonable Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).
141. Gray v. Hall, 295 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (giving the example of large salaries
for corporate officers which “might be justified where a corporation has large retained earnings”).
142. Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381.
143. See also Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); O’NEAL & THOMPSON,
supra note 8, § 7:12; Thompson, supra note 140 at 219.
144. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984).
145. F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33
BUS. LAW. 873, 885 (1978).
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surrounding the phrase “reasonable expectations.”146 It is not completely
clear which expectations, if defeated, would show oppression.147 A minority shareholder may have entered the enterprise with the expectation that he
would make a return on his investment, but a failure to receive dividends
would not necessarily mean that the minority had been a target of oppressive conduct if the corporation was unprofitable.148
The ILLCA uses the term oppression but does not define it.149 Rather,
Illinois courts use a definition similar to the first one quoted above. For
instance, in Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. Harris, the Illinois Supreme
Court considered whether a controlling group of shareholders in a close
corporation acted oppressively when, following an exchange of harsh
words, they effectively forced one of their investors out of the business by
firing him from his positions as secretary and consultant and voting him off
of the board of directors.150 In its analysis, the court quoted an earlier case
where a corporation’s president acted oppressively by engaging in an
‘arbitrary, overbearing and heavy-handed’ course of conduct . . . including his failure to call board meetings; his failure to consult
with the plaintiff shareholder and officer regarding management of corporate affairs; his imperious attitude when questioned about his salary;
and, his dilatory action in response to certain requests made by plaintiffs.151

01/14/2015 15:25:42

146. Miller, supra note 8, at 461–62 (“It may be argued, however, that the reasonable expectations
test is vague and provides insufficient guidance to the business and legal communities.”); see Ritchie v.
Rupe, No. 11-0447, 2014 WL 2788335 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 2014) (refusing to recognize the reasonable
expectations definition of oppression because the standard “is so vague and subject to so many different
meanings in different circumstances”).
147. Id.
148. In re Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1179 (“Majority conduct should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner’s subjective hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled.
Disappointment alone should not necessarily be equated with oppression.”).
149. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1 (West 2013).
150. Jaffe Commercial Fin. Co. v. Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 227–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
151. Id. at 231 (quoting Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 N.E.2d 574, 581 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1972)).
152. See also Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 170 N.E.2d 131, 138 (Ill. 1960), reh’g denied, 170 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. 1960); Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 839, 842–43 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Compton, 285 N.E.2d at 581.
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The Jaffe court discussed oppression and freeze-outs in the same breath,
indicating that Illinois falls in line with those states that view oppression as
a cause of action for a minority interest-holder who is forced out of the
business.152
While oppression predated the LLC and made it into many LLC statutes, there is less case law on oppression in the LLC context than the close
corporation context because the LLC is a relatively new form of business
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entity.153 Even though most of the case law defining oppression involves
close corporations, the cases and their discussions of oppression are equally
applicable in the LLC context. Had the legislature wanted to convey a different meaning, it could have chosen a term that was not already a term of
art appearing in many cases and corporation statutes.
1. Dissolution: The Principal Remedy for Oppression
Courts and legislatures have approached the problem of oppressive
conduct against minority shareholders through a combination of equitable
doctrines and statutory remedies.154 One such remedy is dissolution of the
entity.155 Many business corporation acts make dissolution available to
shareholders of close corporations upon the occurrence of certain events.156
For example, prior to oppression doctrines, dissolution was the traditional
remedy in cases of deadlock.157 In a typical deadlock scenario, disagreement among the shareholders or a breakdown in their relationship makes
management of the corporation effectively impossible, and the shareholders
are unable to resolve their disputes on their own—either because they cannot get 51 percent of the votes for any one course of action or because the
bylaws have no provision for resolving deadlock.158
Over time, states began extending the dissolution remedy to oppressed
minority members as well.159 However, dissolution as a remedy is far from
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153. See EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 498 (“The LLC is a relatively new form. As a result, the
LLC statutes are still evolving and the case law is still sparse.”); HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1182
(“[T]he LLC is a relatively new form of business organization in [the United States]. Although its
‘birth’ dates back to 1977, its widespread use is more recent. Compared to other forms of business
organization . . . the LLC is less established, and there are still a number of open questions for lawyers
and courts to wrestle with.”).
154. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 462.
155. See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (1994) for a statute typical of many state
involuntary dissolution statutes.
156. Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Appropriate Equitable
Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 295–96 (1990) (“Today every state has a statute that permits courts to
dissolve corporations. Most states specifically permit judicially decreed dissolution if directors or
shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, or if the directors have acted fraudulently, oppressively,
or illegally.”); see, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.35 (West 2013); REV. MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 14.30(2) (1994).
157. HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 462; see CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 363 (but note that
“courts have been reluctant to order dissolution of [profitable corporations] on deadlock grounds”).
158. See generally Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25 (1987).
159. In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (N.Y. 1984) (observing that historically
dissolution was only allowed in certain narrow, statutorily prescribed situations, and that more recently
courts may order dissolution as an equitable remedy or as a remedy for oppression); CARY &
EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 377 (“[P]artly based on a wave of dissolution-for-oppression statutes,
courts . . . became more willing to grant dissolution . . . not only on the ground of deadlock but also on
the ground of oppression.”).
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a panacea. Dissolution is not always the appropriate remedy, nor is it always a reliable one. Courts look at dissolution as a last resort when the
parties’ relationship has degenerated to the point where the corporation can
no longer function.160 Courts are reluctant to order dissolution because it is
very harsh161—not only does it spell death for the corporation, it also
means that the corporation must wind up and liquidate its assets.162 Typically, the company’s assets are sold off quickly at a “fire sale,” and as a
result, the corporation will lose much of its going concern value in the process.163
2. In re Radom & Neirdorff: An Example of Courts’ Traditional
Reluctance toward Dissolution
A case illustrative of the courts’ attitude toward dissolution is In re
Radom & Neidorff, Inc.164 In Radom, a brother and sister were the sole
shareholders of a close corporation; each owned a fifty percent interest.165
The brother also served as president and bore the responsibility for managing the business.166 The two siblings disliked and distrusted each other, and
their feud carried over into the management of the corporation.167 The sister
refused to sign her brother’s salary checks or to participate at shareholder
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160. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 444 (“At one time, courts were extremely reluctant to order the
involuntary dissolution of a profitable business, on the ground that it was bad social policy . . . .”); see,
e.g., Bator v. United Sausage Co., 81 A.2d 442, 444 (Conn. 1951) (“Dissention among the members of
a corporation is not a ground for dissolution unless it goes so far as to render it impossible to carry on
the corporate affairs.”); In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. 1954); Wollman v.
Littman, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (“Irreconcilable differences even among an
evenly divided board of directors do not in all cases mandate dissolution . . . .”).
161. Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996) (citing Coduti v. Hellwig, 469 N.E.2d
220, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)) (“Judicial dissolution is an extreme remedy which courts are properly
reluctant to order.”); O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:22 (“Courts traditionally have viewed
dissolution as a drastic remedy, and they have been extremely reluctant to terminate a profitable operating business.”); Bahls, supra note 156, at 296 (“Courts historically looked askance at dissolution as an
extreme remedy. If alternative equitable remedies were available to resolve the dissension, they were
ordered frequently.”).
162. Bahls, supra note 156, at 297 (“When corporations are liquidated, they usually sell their
assets for cash.”).
163. Id. (“[T]he sale [of assets] does not yield the maximum value for any of the shareholders.
Auction sales are fire sales. Rather than selling the entire business as a going concern, the business
assets might be sold separately. If so, the sale does not yield the full value of a going concern.”); see
also EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 468 (“[A] mandatory sale of close corporation’s business in the
context of a dissolution proceeding may not in fact realize the fair value of the business. The problem
with such a sale is that there may be no ready market for the corporation’s business . . . .”).
164. In re Radom, 119 N.E.2d at 563.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 564.
167. Id.
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meetings to elect a board of directors.168 The corporation did not declare
dividends, and some of the corporation’s debts went unpaid.169
The brother petitioned the court to order dissolution of the corporation, but the court denied his petition.170 Despite facts showing that the
corporation was embroiled in internal conflicts and the brother had not
been paid a salary, the court held that there was “no absolute right to dissolution” under the circumstances.171 The court stated that it would only be
willing to grant a petition for dissolution where “the competing interests
‘are so discordant as to prevent efficient management’ and the ‘object of
[the corporation’s] existence cannot be attained.’”172 The court justified
denying the petition by pointing to the fact that the corporation was still
solvent and making a profit; however, as the dissent points out, the corporation’s long-term financial health was much more precarious.173
In denying the petition for dissolution, the court stated that the brother
had other remedies available to him, but it failed to say what they were.174
In reality, the irreconcilable discord left the brother with only two options:
he could either continue to work without pay, or resign from his position as
president and risk a financial loss to the corporation.175 Such a position is
untenable. Radom is emblematic of the classic dilemma that minority
shareholders face in cases of deadlock and freeze-outs. Courts’ reluctance
to order dissolution may leave plaintiffs without a remedy.
II. TUTUNIKOV V. MARKOV: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROBLEM
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168. Id.
169. Id. at 566.
170. Id. at 565.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing In re Importers’ and Grocers’ Exch., 30 N.E. 401, 404 (N.Y. 1892)).
173. Id. at 566–68.
174. See id. at 565.
175. Id. at 567.
176. Tutunikov v. Markov, 2013 WL 3940889, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2013).
177. Id. at *2.
178. Id. at *2–3 (noting, however, that the exact percentage of each party’s ownership interest was
in dispute. In some years, the controlling group reported on their tax returns that they owned 41.25
percent each, or a combined interest of 82.50 percent).
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Tutunikov v. Markov,176 decided in 2013, represents a position that, if
followed in Illinois, could deter investment and discourage the growth of
small businesses. The parties were both members of an LLC in the business
of developing financial software.177 Tutunikov, the plaintiff, was a minority
member with a 10 percent equity interest, and the defendants were a controlling group, owning a combined interest of 74 percent.178 The parties’
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Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *8; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2013).
Tutunikov, 2013 WL 3940889, at *6.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.

01/14/2015 15:25:42
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relationship began to break down at the end of 2003.179 In December of that
year, the defendants announced they would be paying themselves a salary
twice as large as they had in prior years.180 They also failed to inform Tutunikov of negotiations with a potential investor who was proposing to invest
at least $500,000 in the company in exchange for substantial equity.181
Further, the trial court found that the defendants had paid themselves distributions attributable to treasury shares that should have been distributed
to all shareholders proportionately.182
After negotiations over a buyout of Tutunikov’s interest broke down,
Tutunikov filed suit.183 In his complaint, Tutunikov alleged, inter alia, that
the defendants had “breached fiduciary and contractual obligations to plaintiffs ‘as managing members [of the company] and acted unfairly and oppressively’.”184 Even though the case involved an LLC, Tutunikov brought
his oppression claim under New Jersey’s Business Corporation Act because
there was no equivalent oppression provision under the New Jersey LLC
Act.185 The trial court agreed with Tutunikov, reasoning that “it is appropriate in the absence of situations not covered by the LLCA to look to the
[BCA] for guidance. Because the LLCA is silent regarding relief for claims
of oppression, the court may logically look to the [BCA] for appropriate
remedies.”186 The court found that the “defendants engaged in oppressive
conduct toward the minority shareholders,” thus entitling Tutunikov to a
buyout of his interest in the company.187 However, on appeal, the New
Jersey Superior Court overturned the ruling, holding that Tutunikov had
“no cognizable claim”;188 the court refused to import the remedy for oppression from the New Jersey Business Corporation Act into the LLC context.189
The result from Tutunikov is troubling. Do minority members of an
LLC require less protection than their close corporation counterparts? Is
there a policy reason for allowing oppression claims in one context and not
the other? This seems incongruent with the law of LLCs, which generally
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recognizes that the LLC is a hybrid of a partnership and a corporation,190
founded on legal doctrines from both entities.191
Illinois, like New Jersey, is among the states that recognize a statutory
cause of action for oppression.192 Further, the ILLCA does provide a cause
of action for oppression where the New Jersey LLC Act does not.193 Even
so, the ILLCA in its current form is inadequate because it fails to define
oppression and only provides successful litigants with one remedy: dissolution followed by a windup of the LLC.
III. OPPRESSION IN ILLINOIS: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Oppression in LLCs is not unique to Illinois, but the problem is worsened by the way the ILLCA is drafted. In this Part, I argue that the current
remedies for oppression are insufficient or, at best, unreliable. I then propose ways to improve the remedies available to minority members in the
form of statutory amendments and equitable remedies.
A. Existing Remedies under the ILLCA
1. Dissolution
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190. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 498 (“Limited liability companies are noncorporate entities that
are created under special statutes that combine elements of corporation and partnership law.”).
191. Id.; HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 1186 (“Because LLC statutes often reflect a mishmash of
corporation, partnership, and limited partnership principles, courts frequently analogize to existing
doctrines from other business forms when confronting LLC issues[.]”).
192. See supra note 132; 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1 (West 2014).
193. § 35-1.
194. In Illinois, the judicial dissolution statutes for non-public corporations and for LLCs are 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(b) (West 2014) and 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-1 (West 2014),
respectively.
195. See supra notes 160–161 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Currently, dissolution is the only statutory remedy for oppression under the ILLCA.194 Limiting an oppressed minority member’s remedies to
dissolution effectively vitiates any protection that an oppression provision
can offer. Because courts are reluctant to order dissolution,195 a minority
member may be left without a remedy even where there is strong evidence
of oppressive conduct.196 Even if a minority member succeeds at having the
company dissolved, the member may only recover a fraction of his original
investment in the company.197 Upon dissolution, the company must wind
up and its assets are typically sold off quickly, on a piecemeal basis, for a
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price far below their going concern value.198 Additionally, there are those
who may not want to dissolve the company but would rather see it continue
to operate with some changes to the management structure. For those who
fall in this latter group, there are multiple options under the IBCA, but the
ILLCA provides no relief. There may be some situations where dissolution
is the proper or most appropriate remedy, but dissolution alone is not sufficient to protect the rights of minority members or to provide relief after a
court’s finding of oppression.
2. Buyouts

Id.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/35-60(a) (West 2014).
Id. § 35-45(1).
Id. § 35-50.
Id. § 15-5(b)(5).
Id. § 35-60(a).
Id. §§ 35-60(b), (d).
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The ILLCA makes it fairly easy for a member to dissociate from the
company, after which the company must purchase the former member’s
interest.199 Among the enumerated circumstances causing dissociation is
“[t]he company’s having notice of the member’s express will to withdraw . . . .”200 In other words, a member can dissociate merely by expressing his will to do so. And under Section 35-50, a member of a membermanaged LLC has this power to dissociate, rightfully or wrongfully, at any
time.201 The operating agreement cannot restrict this power.202 The value of
the dissociated member’s interest is its fair value determined at the time of
dissociation.203 After dissociation, the company must deliver an offer to
purchase within 30 days, and if no agreement is reached within 120 days,
the dissociated member may bring a proceeding asking the court to order
the company to purchase the interest.204
Based on these sections, it would seem like dissociation provides an
easy answer to the issue of oppression. Instead of bringing a claim and
dissolving the company, the oppressed minority can simply dissociate at
will and receive a mandatory buyout of its interest. If this were true, then a
statutorily mandated buyout would be an alternate route for an oppressed
minority to draw its investment out of the company. Unfortunately, for
several reasons, this option is not a reliable one.
There are a number of important ways that an operating agreement can
limit a minority member’s ability to receive a buyout, and some are plain in
the language of the ILLCA. Whereas a member of a member-managed
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205. Id. § 35-50.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 15-5(b)(5).
208. See generally Lin Hanson, For LLC Minority Owners, “Fair Value” Often Isn’t, 93 ILL. B.J.
148 (2005).
209. Weigel Broad. Co. v. Smith, 682 N.E.2d 745, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“The fact that the
statute requires dissenting shareholders to be given ‘fair value,’ without specifically defining the term,
we think, evidences a legislative intent to allow courts the freedom to fashion a remedy without limiting
them to any single form of valuation. It is a legislative grant of broad discretion.”); Independence Tube
Corp. v. Levine, 535 N.E.2d 927, 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (“There may be situations in which the
minority or illiquid nature of the stock diminishes its value. In such instances, these factors should be
considered in determining fair value.”).
210. See Hanson, supra note 208, at 148–49.
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LLC has an inalienable power to dissociate, a member of a managermanaged LLC does not. Section 35-50 specifically states, “If an operating
agreement does not specify in writing the time or the events upon the happening of which a member of a manager-managed company may dissociate, a member does not have the power, rightfully or wrongfully, to
dissociate from the company.”205 Yet even where the member does have
the power to dissociate, the member may be unable to receive a buyout.
Section 15-5(b)(5) states that the operating agreement can “determine
whether a dissociation is wrongful” or not. A wrongful dissociation makes
the member liable to the company for damages,206 which can offset any
money the member would be entitled to receive as payment for his or her
interest. Even more striking is Section 15-5(b)(5), which states that “[the
operating agreement] may eliminate or vary the obligation of the limited
liability company to purchase the dissociated member’s distributional interest.”207 This provision allows the parties to eliminate the right to a buyout altogether. Thus, a minority member in an LLC with a slanted or
artfully drafted operating agreement cannot rely on a right to a buyout as
protection against oppression.
Even if a member is able to dissociate, the problems inherent to valuation may prevent a dissociating member from actually receiving fair value
for his or her interest.208 If the dissociating member’s interest is substantial,
then the parties may go through prolonged litigation and spend considerable resources arguing over the value of the interest and whether it is fair.
Further, Illinois courts have held that the phrase “fair value” in the statute
gives them discretion to determine whether a minority interest should be
discounted for lack of control or lack of marketability.209 These discounts
further punish the minority member. The minority member lacks control of
the company and its shares are already unmarketable; awarding a member
less than fair value upon leaving the company only adds insult to injury.210
Because of the problems involved in valuation, the limits on dissociation,
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and the power to eliminate the right to a buyout, the buyout is only an illusory remedy.
B. The Illinois Limited Liability Company Act
Section 35-1 of the ILLCA, which enumerates the events causing dissolution and wind up of the company’s business, is the only section that
mentions oppression. In relevant part, the section states:
A limited liability company is dissolved, and . . . its business must be
wound up, upon the occurrence of . . . [an] application by a member or a
dissociated member, upon entry of judicial decree that . . . the managers
or members in control of the company have acted, are acting, or will act
in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent with respect to the
petitioner.211

Starting with the text of the statute, it would seem that dissolution
must follow upon a finding of oppression. The statute states this as an imperative.212 Once a court finds oppression, the business must undergo dissolution.213 Oppression is not defined elsewhere in the act, and dissolution is
the only remedy available.
In contrast to the limited relief under the ILLCA, Section 12.56 of the
IBCA provides a nonexhaustive list of twelve remedies available to an
oppressed minority shareholder of a close corporation.214 Courts may
choose from any of the remedies on the list in fashioning a remedy for the
aggrieved party. Under 12.56(a), if the plaintiff establishes that “[t]he directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will
act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent[,]”215 the relief that
the trial court may order

§ 35-1(4)(E).
Id. (“A limited liability company is dissolved, and . . . its business must be wound up . . . .”)
Id.
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56(b) (West 2007).
Id. § 12.56(a)(3).
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includes but is not limited to the following: (1) The performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting aside of any action of the corporation or of
its shareholders, directors, or officers of or any other party to the proceedings; (2) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation’s articles of incorporation or by-laws; (3) The removal from office
of any director or officer; (4) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer; (5) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(6) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs of
the corporation to serve for the term and under the conditions prescribed
by the court; (7) The appointment of a provisional director to serve for
the term and under the conditions prescribed by the court; (8) The submission of the dispute to mediation or other forms of non-binding alter-
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native dispute resolution; (9) The payment of dividends; (10) The award
of damages to any aggrieved party; (11) The purchase by the corporation
or one or more other shareholders of all, but not less than all, of the
shares of the petitioning shareholder for their fair value and on the terms
determined under subsection (e); or (12) The dissolution of the corporation if the court determines that no remedy specified in subdivisions (1)
through (11) or other alternative remedy is sufficient to resolve the matters in dispute.216

The disparity between the two statutes is inexplicable given the similarities between the plights of the minority shareholder and minority member. Both statutes have similar policy goals, but one has a much more
limited means of achieving those goals.
C. Proposed Solutions to Oppression in Illinois LLCs: Providing
Additional Remedies
The Illinois legislature should amend the ILLCA to create more remedies for minority shareholders. Failing that, courts sitting in equity should
import the remedies from the IBCA and make them available to oppressed
minority members. Both of these solutions are aimed at increasing the protections for minority members of LLCs against oppressive conduct. The
additional security will make investors feel more comfortable investing in
businesses formed as LLCs, because they will not be as concerned about an
oppressive majority freezing them out of the business or holding their investment hostage.
1. Proposed Amendments to the ILLCA

01/14/2015 15:25:42

216. Id. § 12.56(b) (emphasis added). I included the lengthy statute here to illustrate how many
more options there are in the close corporation context than the LLC context.
217. See supra notes 140–148 and accompanying text.
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First, the legislature should amend the ILLCA to define oppressive
conduct and add greater clarity to the circumstances that give rise to a
cause of action for oppression. The legislature should use the “expectations” definition discussed above, because it draws the focus away from the
oppressor’s conduct and puts it back onto the minority’s decision to invest
in the company.217 It also gives courts the discretion to render ad hoc decisions for an issue that is highly situational and fact-specific. For example, if
a person who invested in an LLC, expecting to be personally employed in
the company, was inexplicably fired and then frozen out of the business, he
could point to the firing in arguing that the majority acted oppressively.
The same would be true for a member who originally invested with the
expectation of receiving dividends. The expectations definition has broad
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support from respected corporate law commentators, and it has already
been adopted by many other jurisdictions.218
Section 1-5 of the ILLCA, the definitions section, is the most appropriate place for this amendment.219 The added provision would read as follows: “‘Oppressive’ means a manner of conduct which frustrates the reareasonable expectations that another member or former member had at the
time it purchased its membership interest.” In any case, defining oppression
in this way will help clarify members’ rights and the set of facts entitling an
oppressed member to a remedy.
Further, an amendment should also add a new section containing a list
of remedies for oppression modeled after Section 12.56 of the IBCA. The
added section would include a nonexhaustive list of discretionary remedies,
giving courts the flexibility to choose the most appropriate form of relief
based on the circumstances. The new section would replace the old oppression provision, and state:
Upon entry of a judicial decree that the managers or members in control
of the company have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent with respect to another member or former
member, the relief that a court may order includes but is not limited to:
(1) an injunction against further oppressive conduct; (2) a purchase, by
the company or one of its members, of the oppressed member’s interest
for its fair value; (3) the amendment of any provision in the company’s
operating agreement; (4) the appointment or removal of any individual as
manager of the company; (5) a distribution of profits in proportion to the
oppressed member’s interest; (6) an award of damages to the oppressed
member; (7) the appointment of a custodian to manage the business and
affairs of the company; (8) the dissolution followed by wind-up of the
company.

01/14/2015 15:25:42

218. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
219. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-5 (West 2014)
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This suggested amendment includes some of the most commonly requested forms of relief, including a buyout, reinstatement on the board of
managers, declaration of dividends, and injunctive relief. The Illinois legislature may also decide to have separate lists for manager-managed and
member-managed LLCs in order to provide specific relief depending on the
LLC’s management structure.
As explained above, neither the ILLCA’s current remedy of dissolution nor a member’s illusory right to a buyout are adequate remedies for
oppression. And from a policy perspective, there is no strong reason for
distinguishing between LLCs and close corporations regarding minority
oppression—in both contexts the minority is in a particularly vulnerable
position for the same reasons: lack of control, marketability, and judicial
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oversight over the majority’s management. In fact, a minority member’s
investment is even more vulnerable and precarious than that of a minority
shareholder’s because of the LLC’s structural and managerial flexibility.220
Through artful drafting and superior bargaining power, a majority member
can force the minority into an even weaker position.221 At the very least, the
legislature should amend Section 15-5 so that the operating agreement cannot eliminate a member’s right to receive a buyout. That way, a member
can pull out his or her investment in the event of a freeze-out, preventing
the company from holding a member’s interest hostage. Granting an inalienable right to a buyout does not completely solve the problem of oppression, but it goes quite a long way.222
2. Equitable Remedies to Oppression

01/14/2015 15:25:42

220. See supra notes 8, 96.
221. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 930.
222. See Heatherington & Dooley, supra note 92, at 6 (concluding that a statutory right to receive
a buyout is an effective solution to the problem of the minority shareholder’s vulnerability at the hands
of the majority).
223. See, e.g., Schirmer v. Bear, 672 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ill. 1996); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983); Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J. 1993); Baker v. Commercial
Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395–96 (Or. 1973) (listing ten possible remedies for oppression
short of dissolution).
224. Brenner, 634 A.2d at 1033.
225. Id. at 1031. For a case where the court took a similar approach and instead declined to recognize a common law cause of action for oppression, see Ritchie v. Rupe, No. 11-0447, 2014 WL
2788335, at *13 (Tex. June 20, 2014) (“This Court has never recognized a common-law cause of action
for ‘minority shareholder oppression.’”).
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Second, even if the legislature fails to amend the ILLCA, judges
should craft an equitable remedy or import one from the IBCA. Other
courts have recognized that courts of equity have various tools at their disposal for dealing with oppression.223 Illinois courts could adopt a stance
similar to the one taken in Brenner v. Berkowitz, where the court stated,
“Most acts of misconduct or oppression will warrant some type of remedy . . . . Importantly, courts are not limited to the statutory remedies, but
have a wide array of equitable remedies available to them.”224 The Brenner
court reasoned that the remedial provisions of the statute were superimposed on top of a body of common law and did not replace the court’s inherent equitable powers.225 If the ILLCA contained a nonexhaustive list of
remedies similar to that of the IBCA, then courts would have the discretion
to create equitable remedies other than the ones explicitly listed.
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IV. RESPONDING TO CRITICISMS
This final Part responds to potential arguments against creating additional remedies for oppressed LLC members. Critics may take the position
that additional remedies are unnecessary and, therefore, there is no need to
amend the ILLCA. Critics may also argue that additional, flexible remedies
would be incongruent with the body of corporate law legal doctrines. This
Part addresses and rejects both kinds of counterarguments.
A. The Appeal of Formalism

01/14/2015 15:25:42

226. See Tutunikov v. Markov, 2013 WL 3940889, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 2013).
227. Id. at *9.
228. See generally O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 7, § 1:18 (discussing corporate formalities).
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Some courts and commentators may balk at expanding the rights of
oppressed LLC members based on the remedies available to shareholders
of close corporations. This may be due in part to the attractiveness of a
formalistic approach. A court taking this approach would be reluctant to
import remedies from the IBCA, reasoning that legislatures created certain
rights and remedies in one context and intentionally chose not to make
them available outside that context. Out of respect for the intent of the legislature and public policy, it would be improper to judicially extend the law
beyond what the people’s representatives thought was appropriate. This
was the reasoning behind the Tutunikov court’s holding.226 The Tutunikov
court thought that the conspicuous absence of a cause of action for oppression from the New Jersey LLC Act was tantamount to an expression of the
legislature’s intent that there should be none.227
This approach has some appeal, especially in the formalistic field of
corporate law. Indeed, corporations themselves are formalistic by nature.228
Business entities are a legal fiction, created by legislatures to achieve economic and policy objectives. It makes sense that a person who specifically
chooses to organize as an LLC and not some other entity should have his
decision honored in court. That person may have deliberately chosen the
LLC over other entities at least in part due to the lack of certain obligations
toward minority members. A formalistic approach is also attractive to entrepreneurs, investors, and businesspeople because it boasts increased stability and predictability. It is easier for an entrepreneur to plan and organize
a business when he does not have to worry about the legislature significantly altering his rights and obligations later on.
However, borrowing legal doctrines from another context is not unheard of in corporate law. Cases dealing with agreements between share-
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holders of corporations are one example. Originally, courts were adverse to
shareholder agreements where they contravened the corporate form by
impinging on the authority of the board of directors.229 While most agreements between shareholders are valid, in the past, some courts held that
such contracts were illegal if shareholders attempted to use them as an instrument to bind or control matters that should be left up to the board of
directors, such as hiring officers, determining corporate policies, or managing the business.230 For example, in McQuade v. Stoneham, a New York
court held that a shareholder agreement that fixed officers’ salaries was
illegal because it was contrary to the corporate form and, therefore, void as
against public policy.231
Two years following McQuade, a court created an exception to the
McQuade holding for close corporations. In Clark v. Dodge, the court held
a shareholder agreement legal and enforceable even though it restricted the
authority of the board of directors.232 In Clark, the parties to the contract
were the sole directors and shareholders of the corporation.233 Therefore,
any invasion of the board’s authority was minimal.234 Furthermore, the
agreement was not against public policy because enforcing the agreement
would not be detrimental to any interested parties; no creditors were
harmed, and there was no fraud.235 Illinois falls in line with Clark and takes
the position that when dealing with close corporations, a court should not
invalidate a shareholder agreement as against public policy where there is
no apparent public injury, no complaining minority interest, and no harm to
creditors.236 Upholding shareholder agreements is just one example of
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 115 Side B
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229. See generally CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 3, at 279 (“[C]orporation law has not in the
past been as attuned to contractualization, and in the corporate context there has often been serious
question whether such arrangements will be deemed valid.”).
230. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918) (“the law does not permit the stockholders
to create a sterilized board of directors.”); Creed v. Copps, 152 A. 369, 370 (Vt. 1930) (“[T]he business
management of a corporation is confided to its directors . . . . They represent all the stockholders and
creditors and cannot enter into agreements, either among themselves or the stockholders, by which they
abrogate their independent judgments.”); but see Luthy v. Ream, 110 N.E. 373, 375 (1915) (“[I]t is
legitimate for the owners of a majority of the stock of a corporation to combine for the purpose of
controlling the corporation.”).
231. McQuade v. Stoneham, 189 N.E. 234, 236–38 (N.Y. 1934).
232. See Clark v. Dodge, 199 N.E. 641 (N.Y. 1936).
233. Id. at 643.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (2014) (permitting shareholder agreements, reflecting the
general trend in most states now that such agreements are permissible); Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d
577, 584–85 (Ill. 1964) (“this court [has] generally up[held], in the absence of fraud or prejudice to
minority interests or public policy, the right of stockholders to agree among themselves as to the manner in which their stock will be voted . . . .”); HAMILTON, supra note 21, at 389 (“[Galler] has had a
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courts’ willingness to modify legal doctrines in the close corporation and
small business context.
Despite the appeals of formalism, my recommendations are not inconsistent with a formalistic approach. I am arguing that the Illinois state legislature should formally amend the ILLCA to clarify and define a cause of
action that already exists under the Act. Amending the ILLCA would actually add legal precision and clarify the present ambiguity regarding the
rights of minority members. But even a judicially created remedy would
not be a departure from past decisions. Without an amendment, judges
would simply look to the IBCA and import a remedy already available to
close corporations. Courts have recognized the need for flexibility when
dealing with close corporations and LLCs, and borrowing remedies or importing legal doctrines is not wholly inconsistent with corporate law. As
discussed earlier, the law of close corporations has borrowed substantially
from partnership doctrines, especially in the area of fiduciary duties.237
Shareholder agreements, also discussed above, are another example.238
A decision importing a remedy would not be inconsistent with policy either, because the LLC already has a dual identity as a quasi-corporation
even though it is not a close corporation. Any argument to formalism, although appealing, is ultimately unavailing because it does not give enough
significance to the history and development of these entities and the policies underlying the LLC.
B. Bargaining for Protection in Founders’ Agreements

01/14/2015 15:25:42

significant impact on the development of close corporation law. Its call for special legislative treatment
of closely held corporations has led to statutory developments in most states.”).
237. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 229–236 and accompanying text.
239. For an example of this argument, see the court’s opinion in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d
1366, 1379–80 (Del. 1993) (“The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a purchasing
minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for protection before parting with consideration.”).
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An opponent to amending the ILLCA might argue that there is no
need for additional protection for minority shareholders because the founders can simply write safeguards into the operating agreement.239 After all,
that is what partners may do when drafting a partnership agreement. Someone taking this position would assert that the real solution is better lawyering, and not changes to the statutory scheme. But this argument fails for
several reasons. The party with the minority share of the company is usually in a weaker negotiating position and might not be able to bargain for the
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protection it needs.240 Also, no one can predict every eventuality, and it is
unrealistic to think that the parties can obviate every problem. Finally, and
most significantly, many small businesses may have inadequate operating
agreements or no agreement at all.241
In practice, founders often fail to draft agreements among themselves
ex ante.242 First, the founders of a small business are often friends or family, and they assume that they will be able to resolve every disagreement
amicably.243 This “atmosphere of mutual trust” leaves the shareholders
without a plan for valuation or for how to break a deadlock.244 Second, the
founders may be inexperienced in business and may fail to recognize the
need to protect themselves contractually.245 Founders of small businesses
and entrepreneurs do not necessarily think about these agreements the same
way a lawyer would.246 Third, founders who are friends may not want to
talk about worst case scenarios for fear that it will arouse harsh feelings and
taint the close relationship that they have with their co-founders.247 In other
words, they may feel that hard bargaining will harm their business or personal relationship with the other shareholders.248 Fourth, oppressive conduct can occur in multifarious ways, and it is difficult to foresee the
situations that necessitate contractual protection.249 Fifth, founders may be
reluctant to bind themselves to a long-term agreement that they might not
like later on when the circumstances have changed and they have developed different expectations for the business.250 Lastly, a fully customized
operating agreement is time consuming to draft, and many small businesses
do not have the money to pay for extensive legal services.251 It is difficult
enough for a small business to turn a profit during the early stages, and
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 116 Side B
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240. O’Neal, supra note 145, at 883 (shareholders of close corporations “may be unaware of the
risks involved, or [their] bargaining position may be so weak that [they are] unable to negotiate for
protection”).
241. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 930 (“Unfortunately statutory default provisions
denying LLC members dissociation rights . . . comes at a heavy price for less sophisticated persons that
either cannot or will not seek competent legal advice before proceeding.”).
242. Moll, supra note 4, at 911.
243. Id. at 912–15.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 912; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001).
246. See Moll, supra note 4, at 912.
247. Id. at 915.
248. Id. at 915–16.
249. Id. at 913.
250. Id. at 914.
251. Id. at 916 n.112.
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there may not be money in the budget for an operating agreement with all
the “bells and whistles.”
No LLC should be without an operating agreement. But even where
there is an agreement, the minority may end up in an even worse position if
the terms are inadequate or slanted in favor of the parties holding a majority interest.252 The party with the controlling interest may write the operating agreement to make dissociation wrongful or otherwise restrict the
ability of the minority interest-holder to draw its capital out of the business.253 For these reasons, members of an LLC cannot expect to fully rely
on operating agreements or good lawyering to protect them from shareholder oppression.
C. Fiduciary Duties

01/14/2015 15:25:42

252. See supra note 8.
253. See supra note 73.
254. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-3(a) (West 2010) (providing that members owe fiduciary
duties not just to the company but also to other members).
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. Id. §§ 15-3(b), (d).
257. Compare the ILLCA’s flexible and open-ended, nonexclusive list with the RULLCA fiduciary duty provision, which uses an exclusive list.
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Others may argue that there is no need to amend the ILLCA because
members already have sufficient protection by virtue of the fiduciary duties
owed to them by the other members (or managers in a manager-managed
LLC).254 Section 15-3 of the ILLCA contains a non-exhaustive list of these
duties and what they include: “The fiduciary duties a member owes to a
member-managed company and its other members include the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . .”255 The section goes on to add greater specificity to the duties and also acknowledges the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.256 Since the list of the members’ fiduciary duties is nonexhaustive, it implicitly acknowledges the existence of broader duties not listed.257
Thus, opponents of expanding remedies for oppression would claim that
judicial scrutiny and enforcement of the fiduciary duties owed by members
and managers are sufficient to protect members even without amending the
Act to clarify a member’s rights against oppressive conduct.
This argument has little merit because it ignores the flexibility built into the ILLCA. The open-ended fiduciary duties enumerated in the ILLCA
exist only by default or as a fallback. In practice, managers and members
do not owe fiduciary duties in every situation. The flexibility of the ILLCA
allows founders to alter and partially waive their fiduciary duties through
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258. See Farrar & Hamill, supra note 14, at 914 (“Faced with default provisions allowing partners
and LLC members to withdraw their capital, attorneys are often asked by their business clients . . . to
restrict or eliminate these rights in a tailored operating agreement.”).
259. § 15-5(b)(6).
260. Id. § 15-5(b)(7).
261. See, e.g., Walta v. Gallegos Law Firm, P.C., 40 P.3d 449, 457 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001) (“[W]e
hold that breach of this fiduciary duty can be asserted as an individual claim separate from the remedies
available under our statutory corporate law for oppressive conduct.”).
262. Thompson, supra note 140, at 228 (“[T]he lower threshold and the broader remedies complement one another in enabling courts to respond to the special needs of participants in close corporations.”).
263. § 15-3(g)(1).
264. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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artful drafting of the operating agreement.258 In the agreement, the founders
can identify specific types of categories of conduct and provide that the
conduct does not violate the members’ fiduciary duties as long as doing so
is “not manifestly unreasonable.”259 The same goes for the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing.260
Another problem with this argument is that it elides the distinction between shareholder oppression and breach of fiduciary duty. As stated
above, these two doctrines are not synonymous.261 Since the bar for proving a breach of fiduciary duty is higher than the bar for oppression, the
courts’ ability to provide equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duty may
be inadequate to deal with all kinds of shareholder oppression. The lower
threshold of oppression gives members additional protection against things
like freeze-outs because it embraces conduct that might not rise to the level
of breach of fiduciary duty.262 Furthermore, oppression statutes offer additional protection to members of manager-managed LLCs. Members in
manager-managed LLCs do not owe fiduciary duties to other members.263
As such, a member in a manager-managed LLC has little chance of bringing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty against another member,
but at least he or she retains protection against oppressive conduct, as the
oppression provision cannot be eliminated by the operating agreement.
While giving the founders this added flexibility makes sense conceptually and fits with the LLC’s identity as an entity primarily governed by
contract,264 it puts an additional burden on prospective investors and inexperienced business owners. Any investor looking to become a member in
an LLC will have to pay extra attention to provisions that place certain
types of conduct outside the protection of fiduciary duties. Although a
skilled investor is expected to carefully scrutinize a business before investing, this burden falls heavily on amateur entrepreneurs and small business
owners. And since it is difficult to foresee every problem that will arise
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during the enterprise, a provision that is ostensibly innocuous during the
drafting process may leave a member without protection when something
goes wrong.
CONCLUSION
The popularity of the LLC continues to grow, and more small businesses are opting to organize as LLCs. Problems of oppression, which originated in the close corporation, have carried over to the LLC and will
inevitably become more salient as more member disputes arise. Investors,
considering whether to invest in a minority stake of an LLC, will look to
states’ LLC acts for a baseline of protection. Similarly, founders will flock
to states that have a clear and well-defined legal framework for handling
disputes among members.
For Illinois to be an attractive place for business and investment, the
legislature should amend the ILLCA to define oppression, clarify members’ rights, and provide vulnerable minority members the protection they
need. Even absent an amendment, Illinois courts sitting in equity should
resolve members’ disputes through flexible, equitable remedies. As it
stands now, shareholders of close corporations have many more remedies
under the IBCA than their LLC member counterparts. This discrepancy is
resolvable with the statutory amendments and equitable doctrines proposed
in this Comment. Enacting these changes will positively respond to the
popularity of LLCs among entrepreneurs and meet the needs of investors.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 118 Side A
01/14/2015 15:25:42

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 118 Side B

01/14/2015 15:25:42

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 118 Side B
01/14/2015 15:25:42

